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Search, Mismatch and Unemployment 
 
 




This paper explores the efficiency of the equilibrium allocation in a matching model 
with heterogeneous workers and jobs. In the basic setup the labor force is divided in 
two groups. The high-skill workers are qualified for all jobs, while low-skill workers can 
perform unskilled jobs but not the more attractive skilled jobs. We demonstrate that 
the equilibrium with random search and ex post bargaining is never efficient. Under 
Hosios’ condition the average wage is correct, but bargaining compresses the 
wage distribution relative to workers’ shadow values. The wage compression distorts 
the relative profits of jobs making it too attractive to create skilled jobs. Furthermore, 
the low skill premium may prevent that the two types of workers efficiently sort in 
different jobs. In the first case we show that the market offers too few job 
opportunities for low-skill workers. On the contrary, when mismatch is socially 
wasteful, we find that low-skill workers experience shorter unemployment spells than 
in the efficient allocation. Finally, we show that our results generalize to 





























The recent literature on equilibrium unemployment oﬀe r sm a n ye x a m p l e so fm o d e l sw i t h
ex ante heterogeneous agents.1 This line of research is motivated by the profound shifts
in the pattern of unemployment and wages in most industrialized countries. Furthermore,
these models are a useful tool to analyze how labor market institutions aﬀect the welfare
of diﬀerent cohorts of workers. Nonetheless, since the analysis of the eﬃcient allocations
is still in an early stage, it is often impossible to determine how the labor market should
respond to changes in the economic environment or to identify policies that might improve
s o c i a lw e l f a r e . T h eo b j e c t i v eo ft h i sp a p e ri st ob r i d g et h i sg a p . W ed e r i v et h es t e a d y
state allocations that maximize the value of net-output in a labor market with matching
frictions and heterogeneous workers and jobs and we explain why markets fail to generate
these eﬃcient outcomes.
The starting point of our analysis is the random matching model of Albrecht and Vroman
(2002) (henceforth AV). In the basic setup there are two types of workers and jobs. One
group of workers is qualiﬁed for both jobs but prefers employment in skilled jobs, while the
second group are low-skill workers who can only perform the simple tasks of unskilled jobs.
Furthermore, the distribution of vacant jobs is endogenous. The ex ante identical ﬁrms can
choose the skill requirement of their job before they enter the market. This setup oﬀers
two advantages. The assumption of free entry eliminates ex ante diﬀerences between ﬁrms
plus we only need to consider two possible matching patterns. Under cross-skill matching
the group of high-skill job seekers accepts oﬀers coming from all jobs. In this scenario
some workers are therefore over-qualiﬁed for their jobs. On the contrary, under ex post
segmentation high-skill workers only accept skilled jobs, and so mismatch is absent.
Our ﬁrst result shows that bilateral bargaining never leads to an eﬃcient allocation.
Under Hosios’ condition the average wage is correct, but bargaining compresses the wage
distribution relative to workers’ shadow values. From the viewpoint of social welfare the re-
cruitment of high-skill workers is therefore too attractive, while ﬁrms would like to avoid the
recruitment of low-skill job seekers. We show that this distortion of the payoﬀs stimulates
the creation of skilled jobs whose mass tends to exceed the eﬃcient value. Furthermore,
the low skill premium may prevent the eﬃcient sorting of workers because the high-skill
workers accept too many jobs.
1Some examples are Acemoglu (1999, 2001), Mortensen and Pissarides (1999), Marimon and Zilibotti
(1999), Shimer (2001) and Dolado et al. (2003). In these studies the type of an agent is a permanent feature
that is determined before the agent enters the labor market.
2In the ﬁrst case we ﬁnd that the labor market oﬀers too few job opportunities to low-skill
workers. When the matching pattern is eﬃcient, low-skill workers therefore spend more time
in unemployment than in the eﬃcient allocation. On the contrary, when high-skill workers
fail to reject unskilled jobs we ﬁnd that low-skill workers enjoy shorter unemployment spells
than in the eﬃcient allocation. The explanation for this surprising result is the strong
interaction between the matching pattern and job creation. Under ex post segmentation,
the (eﬃcient) mass of unskilled jobs is much lower than under cross-skill matching. Low-skill
workers may therefore prefer a cross-skill matching equilibrium over an eﬃcient allocation
with ex-post segmentation.
This last result challenges the conventional view that mismatch harms the workers at
the bottom of the skill distribution. To explain why the bargained wages cannot provide
the correct incentives, we draw a parallel with the standard matching environment. With
homogeneous agents on both sides of the market, the entry of an agent produces two eﬀects.
The entrant reduces the meeting rate for the agents who are located on the same side of the
market (ac o n g e s t i o ne x t e r n a l i t y ) and enhances the matching opportunities for the agents
on the other side of the market (a thick market externality). The private agents ignore
these eﬀects, but under Hosios’ condition these two eﬀects cancel out, and so all search
externalities are perfectly internalized in the wages.2
We show that the introduction of heterogeneous workers destroys this scope for eﬃciency.
Given that the matching process is random all job seekers exert the same congestion ex-
ternality on the rest of the workers, while the positive externality on ﬁrms is stronger for
the most qualiﬁed workers because these workers are more productive than low-skill job
seekers.3 Consequently, under Hosios’ condition the two externalities no longer cancel out
and low-skill (high-skill) workers earn more (less) than their shadow value.
Finally, in an extension we show that our results generalize to an environment with
many types. It is also important to stress that there is no need to impose restrictions on
t h es e to fp o s s i b l em a t c h e s .W ej u s th a v et om a k es u r et h a tw o r k e r sp r e f e rd i ﬀerent jobs.
This last feature helps to avoid that the job distribution is degenerate.
2Hosios’ eﬃciency result requires that the matching technology exhibits constant-returns-to-scale. We
maintain this assumption throughout the analysis.
3We could develop the same line of argument for jobs. However, given that ﬁrms are identical and all
jobs make zero proﬁts, the distortions of the resource allocation are entirely driven by the distortions in
the wage payments. This feature is one of the innovations of our study that greatly simplify the eﬃciency
analysis.
32 Related literature
Before we present the model, we brieﬂy want to explain the connections with two closely
related papers. In a seminal paper Sattinger (1995) showed that the search externalities
in markets with heterogeneous agents may give rise to multiple equilibria. The underlying
distortion of the reservation values has the same ﬂavor as in our model. However, in
Sattinger’s model the matching decisions are the only source of ineﬃciency because the
distribution of agents and the probability of encounters are ﬁxed.
In a recent contribution Shimer and Smith (2001a) take his analysis one step further by
introducing a search intensity choice. This choice has no impact on the aggregate number
of meetings, but a higher search intensity places an agent in a better position for a meeting.
Hence, it is as if agents can jump a queue or locate themselves near the entrance of a
bar pushing others to the back. Furthermore, since the returns from search are too high
(low) for agents with a low (high) value they ﬁnd that the decentralized outcome is never
eﬃcient.4
The model of Shimer and Smith (2001a)o ﬀers an elegant framework to analyze the
tension between the private and social returns from search, but the model is too complex to
derive predictions for the aggregate resource allocation. For each type of agent the distor-
tion in the reservation strategy and the search intensity have oﬀsetting eﬀects on the exit
rate and therefore also on the matching opportunities of all the other types. Our contribu-
tion is that we are able to derive clear predictions for the distortions in the aggregate labor
market outcomes in a standard matching model with free entry of ﬁrms. The decisions of
individual agents therefore have an impact on the aggregate number of meetings. Further-
more, we show that the strong interaction between job creation and matching may avoid
that mismatch is harmful for the workers at the bottom of the labor market
Besides the above diﬀerences, we would like to stress one more element that distinguishes
o u rw o r kf r o mS h i m e ra n dS m i t h( 2001a). In their economy the output of a match is strictly
increasing in the quality of both partners. All agents would therefore like to meet the most
attractive type of agent, but this implies that the heterogeneity would vanish if we introduce
their setup into a model with free entry.5 On the contrary in our model workers prefer
diﬀerent jobs. This assumption creates a natural need for search and it avoids that ﬁrms
4In a companion paper they show that the eﬃcient allocation may be non-stationary [Shimer and Smith,
2001b]. We are able to rule out non-stationary eﬃcient allocations whenever cross-skill matching is eﬃcient.
The details are provided in the Appendix.
5The same argument applies to all models of assortative matching that assume (log) supermodular pro-
duction functions. For details see Gautier and Teulings (2004).
4create only type of job.
Finally, we want to devote a few words to the role of bargaining. In our economy bar-
gaining compresses the wage distribution relative to workers’ shadow values. The presence
of low-skill workers is therefore harmful for high-skill workers. This result contrasts sharply
with the predictions of models with wage posting. With perfect information these models
suggest that the decentralized equilibrium is eﬃcient (e.g.M o e n ,1997). This rules out any
interaction between the diﬀerent cohorts of workers. On the contrary, when ﬁrms cannot
post type-speciﬁc wages, the results are mixed. Lang and Dickens (1992, 1993) ﬁnd that
the presence of high-type workers holds down the wages of low-type workers, while Moen
(2003) ﬁnds the opposite result. In his study high-type workers obtain a too high wage
premium. Under posting the skill premium is therefore either eﬃcient or too big which
contrasts sharply with our predictions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3 introduces the model. The next
two sections deﬁne the equilibrium allocations and the eﬃcient allocations that maximize
the value of net-output. The main eﬃciency result is stated at the end of Section 5 while
the underlying distortion of the wage distribution is analyzed in Section 6. This section
also derives the predictions for the aggregate resource allocation. Finally, in section 7 we
discuss the outcome with an arbitrary number of types. Section 8 concludes.
3T h e M o d e l
3.1 Main Assumptions
We consider an economy with a continuum of workers with measure normalized to one and
a large continuum of ﬁrms. All agents are risk-neutral, inﬁnitely-lived and discount the
future at the common rate r.T i m ei sc o n t i n u o u s .
The population of workers is divided in two groups. A fraction µ ∈ (0,1) of workers
is low-skilled, l, while the remaining fraction (1 − µ) is high-skilled, h.T h e r ea r ea l s ot w o
t y p e so fj o b sw h o s em a s si sd e t e r m i n e db yﬁrms. Skilled jobs, s, a r em o r ep r o d u c t i v et h a n
unskilled jobs, n, but require a high-skill worker while unskilled jobs can be ﬁlled by all
candidates. Formally, let y(i,j) deﬁne the ﬂow output of a job j(= n,s) that is ﬁlled by
aw o r k e ro ft y p ei(= l,h). Our assumptions on the production technology can then be
summarized as follows:
5Workers / Jobs Unskilled Skilled
l-type y(l,n)=y(n) y(l,s)=0
h-type y(h,n)=y(n) y(h,s)=y(s)
where y(s) >y (n) > 0.
The above assumptions imply that high-skill workers have a comparative advantage in
skilled jobs. To avoid that employers can reshuﬄe workers inside large ﬁrms with many
jobs, we assume that ﬁrms can open at most one job. The type of job is determined before
the ﬁrm enters the labor market and we assume free entry.
Finally, job destruction is modelled by means of an exogenous shock process. The
arrival rate of shocks is denoted by δ and is the same for all jobs.6 After a shock, the worker
becomes unemployed while the ﬁrm may create a new vacancy.
3.2 Matching
Unemployed workers and vacant jobs are matched together in pairs through an imperfect
matching technology. The total number of random meetings is determined by the standard
(Cobb-Douglas) matching function
m(v,u)=uαv1−α,
where v is the mass of vacancies and u is the mass of unemployed workers. Let θ = v/u
denote the number of vacant jobs per job seeker. The rate at which a vacant job meets
aw o r k e ri st h e ng i v e nb ym(u,v)/v = θ−α, while unemployed workers meet a vacant job
at rate m(u,v)/u = θ1−α. As usual, the meeting rate of workers (ﬁrms) is increasing
(decreasing) in θ.
3.3 Steady state conditions
Below we restrict attention to steady state allocations in which ﬁrms create both types of
jobs. Thus, in some cases match formation may not be feasible, either because a low-skill
worker does not have the required skills or because a high-skill worker prefers to look for a
better job.
6The assumption of a common rate of destruction is made for convenience. The baseline version of the
model therefore fails to capture the positive correlation between job stability and workers’ skill level that is
observed in the data. For more details see Section 7.1.
6Formally, let ϑ denote the share of low-skilled job seekers and let φ denote the share of
vacant jobs that are unskilled jobs. When π ∈ [0,1] denotes the probability that a meeting
b e t w e e nah i g h - s k i l lw o r k e ra n daﬁrm with an unskilled job results in a match, we obtain
the following steady state conditions:7
φθ1−αϑu = δ[µ − ϑu] (1)
[πφ+( 1− φ)]θ1−α (1 − ϑ)u = δ[1 − µ − (1 − ϑ)u]. (2)
The above conditions guarantee that u(l)=ϑu, u(h)=( 1 −ϑ)u and the mass of mismatched
workers are constant over time.
3.4 Wages and Asset Values
T h el a s te l e m e n ti st h ew a g ef o r m a t i o n . W h e nam a t c hi sf o r m e d ,t h eﬁrm-worker pair
shares the surplus of the match according to the (asymmetric) Nash bargaining solution.
The exogenous surplus share of workers is denoted by β ∈ (0,1).
We introduce the following notation. U(i) denotes the value of an unemployed worker
of type i ∈ (h,l), V (j) the value of a vacant job of type j ∈ (n,s), W(i,j) the value of
employment for a worker of type i on a job of type j,a n dJ(i,j) the value of a type j job
ﬁlled by a worker of type i. Accordingly, the surplus of a match between a worker of type i
a n daj o bo ft y p ej is given by S(i,j)=W(i,j)+J(i,j)−V (j)−U(i), while the associated
wage w(i,j) solves the Nash bargaining solution:
(1 − β)[W(i,j) − U(i)] = β [J(i,j) − V (j)]. (3)
Finally, we say that Hosios’ condition is satisﬁed when β = α.
We are now in a position to derive the asset values for ﬁrms and workers. Let b ∈ [0,y(n))
denote the ﬂow return from home production during unemployment. Accordingly, the asset




b + θ1−α(φπ[W(h,n) − U(h)] + (1 − φ)[W(h,s) − U(h)])
ª
(4)
rU(l)=b + θ1−αφ[W(l,n) − U(l)]. (5)
7To avoid uninteresting equilibria in which agents fail to create mutually beneﬁcial matches, we assume
that all matching decisions are taken cooperatively.
7Similarly, let γ denote the cost per unit of time of maintaining a vacant job. The asset




−γ + θ−α(ϑ[J(l,n) − V (n)] + (1 − ϑ)π[J(h,n) − V (n)])
ª
(6)
rV(s)=−γ + θ−α (1 − ϑ)[J(h,s) − V (s)]. (7)
From (4) and (6) it follows that a match between a high-skill worker and an unskilled job
is mutually beneﬁcial when W(h,n) − U(h) and J(n,h) − V (n) are positive. With Nash
bargaining this is equivalent to the condition that S(h,n) is positive. Thus, in equilibrium
π will take value 1 when S(h,n) > 0.
Finally, the asset values of attached agents satisfy:
rW(i,j)=w(i,j) − δ[W(i,j) − U(i)] (8)
rJ(i,j)=y(i,j) − w(i,j) − δ[J(i,j) − V (j)]. (9)
To obtain the equilibrium wage equation, we need to substitute (4)-(9) into (3). Impos-
ing the free entry conditions V (j)=0for j ∈ (n,s), this yields
w(i,j)=rU(i)+β [y(j) − rU(i)], (10)
while the surplus of a viable match satisﬁes:
(r + δ)S(i,j)=y(i,j) − rU(i). (11)





1 if y(n) >r U(h)
∈ [0,1] if y(n)=rU(h)
0 if y(n) <r U(h).
(12)
Equation (12) implies that π is generically driven to its boundary values. Following the
terminology of AV, we say that the equilibrium exhibits cross-skill matching when π =1
and ex post segmentation when π =0 .
83.5 Entry
The equilibrium mass of vacant jobs is determined by free entry. The two free entry condi-
tions are obtained by inserting (3), and (11) into (6), (7). Setting V (j)=0for j ∈ (n,s)
this yields
γ = θ−α (1 − ϑ)(1− β)S(h,s) (13)
γ = θ−α (1 − β)[ϑS(l,n)+( 1− ϑ)πS(h,n)], (14)
where rU(h) and rU(l) are given by:
rU(h)=
b(r + δ)+βθ1−α [πφy(n)+( 1− φ)y(s)]




r + δ + βφθ1−α . (16)
4 Equilibrium allocations
A steady state equilibrium can now be deﬁned as a set of value functions for U(.), V (.),
W(.,.) and J(.,.) that satisfy (6)-(9), (15) and (16), a matching rule πE that satisﬁes (12)
given the reservation value of high-skill workers U(h) and a tuple of aggregate labor market
outcomes (θE,φ E,ϑ E,u E) that solve (1), (2), (13) and (14).
To obtain a concise representation of the equilibrium allocations, we follow the procedure
of AV. First we obtain a no-arbitrage condition for the two types of jobs by equating the
right-hand side of (13) and (14):
ϑ
¡
r + δ + βθ1−α¢
− (1 − π)
£
(1 − ϑ)(r + δ)+βφθ1−α¤
¡
r + δ + πβθ1−α¢¡
r + δ + βφθ1−α¢ =
(1 − ϑ)[y(s) − y(n)]
(r + δ)[y(n) − b]
. (17)
Next, we insert (17) into (13). This yields a reduced-form entry condition for skilled jobs
that depends on y(n) but not on y(s):
γ
¡
r + δ + βφθ1−α¢¡
r + δ + πβθ1−α¢
(1 − β)θ−α £
(r + δ)(ϑ + π(1 − ϑ)) + πβφθ1−α¤ = y(n) − b. (18)
Finally, solving steady state conditions (1)-(2) yields two conditions for φ and u in terms





δ + θ1−α(1 − φ(1 − π))
¤ (19)
φ(θ,ϑ;π)=
µθ1−α(1 − ϑ)+( µ − ϑ)δ
θ1−α[ϑ(1 − µ)+µ(1 − ϑ)(1 − π)]
. (20)
The last step is to substitute the solution for φ(θ,ϑ;π) into (17) and (18). The resulting
pair of conditions determine the possible equilibrium values of θ and ϑ as a function of π.
F o rag i v e nm a t c h i n gr u l eπ these two conditions are therefore suﬃcient to characterize the
equilibrium allocation.
To determine the nature of the overall equilibrium, including the matching rule πE, we
are obliged to use a guess and verify strategy. For an initial guess π0 ∈ {0,1} we use (17)
and (18) to compute the associated values for θ0 and ϑ0. Given these values (20) delivers
the share of unskilled vacancies φ0 and so we can compute the reservation value U(h) by
substituting θ0 and φ0 into (15). If this reservation value is consistent with (12), then
(π0,θ0,ϑ 0,φ 0) constitutes an equilibrium.
It is important to notice that the steady state equilibrium need not be unique. Ac-
cording to AV there exists an intermediate range of parameters in which both matching
conﬁgurations may arise as an equilibrium. This scope for multiple equilibria is due to a
“coordination externality”. Suppose that a large fraction of high-skill job seekers deviates
from a cross-skill matching equilibrium by rejecting unskilled jobs. The immediate eﬀect of
this deviation is a drop in the matching rate of unskilled jobs and this will induce a drop in
the share of unskilled vacancies, φ. In other words the deviation leads to a shift in the job
distribution and in the new situation all high-skill job seekers may ﬁn di to p t i m a lt ot ow a i t
for a skilled job. Furthermore, in the new equilibrium the value of aggregate net-output
may be lower than before. The economy may therefore be locked into the equilibrium with
the lower value of aggregate net-output.
Finally, outside this range AV show that the unique equilibrium exhibits cross-skill
matching (ex post segmentation) for relatively low (high) values of y(s) and 1−µ. A detailed
discussion of the conditions that guarantee existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium is
provided in AV. Here we shall limit ourselves to a comparison between the set of equilibrium
allocations and the set of eﬃcient allocations.
105E ﬃcient allocations
The set of constrained-eﬃcient allocations is derived using the construct of a “social planner”
w h oc h o o s e st h et i m ep a t ho fv a c a n c i e s ,v(s)t and v(n)t,u n e m p l o y m e n t ,u(h)t and u(l)t,
and the matching rule πt ∈ [0,1] for h-type workers to maximize the present discounted
value of output minus the cost of vacancies.








t [u(h)t [πtφty(n)+( 1− φt)y(s)] + u(l)tφty(n)]
+(b − γθt)(u(h)t + u(l)t)}e−rtdt (21)
s.t
˙ u(l)t = δ[µ − u(l)t] − φtθ1−α
t u(l)t (22)
˙ u(h)t = δ[1 − µ − u(h)t] − θ1−α
t u(h)t[πtφt +( 1− φt)]. (23)
The ﬁrst term in (21) denotes the present discounted value of the output of newly created
matches. Adding to this the value of home production minus the cost of vacancies yields
t h et o t a lv a l u eo fn e t - o u t p u t .T h ep l a n n e rm a x i m i z e st h i sv a l u es u b j e c tt ot h et w od y n a m i c
constraints (22) and (23).
To solve the planner’s problem for eﬃcient steady states we write down the current-value
Hamiltonian with multipliers λ(l) and λ(h) for the law of motions (22) and (23) and we




θ1−α[u(h)[πφy(n)+( 1− φ)y(s)] + u(l)φy(n)]
+(b − γθt)(u(h)+u(l))
+λ(l)[δ[µ − u(l)] − φθ1−αu(l)]
+λ(h)[δ[1 − µ − u(h)] − θ1−αu(h)[πφ+( 1− φ)]].
The above problem has three types of necessary conditions.8
The ﬁrst optimality condition (∂H/∂π =0 ), characterizes the eﬃcient matching rule:





1 if y(n) > (r + δ)λ(h)
∈ [0,1] if y(n)=( r + δ)λ(h)
0 if y(n) < (r + δ)λ(h)
(24)
A c c o r d i n gt o( 2 4 ) ,a l lh-type workers should accept unskilled jobs when the ﬂow surplus
y(n) − (r + δ)λ(h) is positive. On the contrary, when the ﬂow surplus is negative,h -type
workers should continue to search for a skilled job. Thus, the only diﬀerence with (12) is
that the planner uses the true social marginal product λ(h) rather than the reservation
value U(h) to evaluate the desirability of matches between high-skill workers and unskilled
jobs.
The shadow values of job seekers are determined by the co-state equations for u(.).L e t
σ(i,j)=[ y(i,j)−(r+δ)λ(i)]/(r+δ) denote the eﬃcient surplus of a match between worker
i and job j. The co-state equations (∂H/∂u(i)=rλ(i) for i ∈ (h,l)) can then be written
as follows:
(r + δ)λ(l)=b + φθ1−ασ(l,n) − (1 − α)θ1−ασ (25)
(r + δ)λ(h)=b + θ1−α[φπσ(h,n)+( 1− φ)σ(h,s)] − (1 − α)θ1−ασ, (26)
where σ denotes the average surplus of a newly created match:
σ = ϑφσ(l,n)+( 1− ϑ)[φπσ(h,n)+( 1− φ)σ(h,s)].
Inspection of the co-state equations show that they consist of three terms. The ﬁrst
two terms are the returns from home production, b, and the expected gain from successful
search, while the third term captures the cost of congestion as the planner takes into account
that an additional job seeker reduces the matching rate for the incumbent job seekers. The
associated cost for society is equal to σ times the reduction in ﬂow of meetings involving
all other job seekers, (1 − α)θ1−α.
The last pair of necessary conditions (∂H/∂v(j)=0for j ∈ (n,s)) stipulates the eﬃcient
mass of v(j):
γ = θ−α (1 − ϑ)σ(h,s) − αθ−ασ (27)
γ = θ−α[ϑσ(l,n)+π(1 − ϑ)σ(h,n)] − αθ−ασ (28)
12The above equations have a similar interpretation as the co-state equations for job seek-
ers, except that v(s) and v(n) are forward-looking jump variables. In an eﬃcient allocation
the shadow value of a vacant job is therefore equal to zero.
A candidate eﬃcient steady state can now be summarized by a pair of shadow values
λ(h) and λ(l) that satisfy (25) and (26), a matching rule πS that satisﬁes (24) given λ(h)
and a vector of aggregate labor market outcomes (θSP,φ SP,ϑ SP,u SP)t h a ts o l v ec o n d i t i o n s
(27) and (28) plus the steady state conditions (1) and (2). It is easy to show that these
conditions may have more than one solution.9 Nonetheless, the eﬃcient solution is generi-
cally unique because the planner selects the candidate optimum that yields the maximum
value of aggregate net-output.
Again we can exploit the no-arbitrage conditions for vacant jobs, to summarize the
eﬃcient labor market outcomes by a single pair of equations:
ϑ(r + δ + θ1−α) − (1 − π)
©
(1 − ϑ)(r + δ)+φθ1−αª
(r + δ + φθ1−α)(r + δ + απθ1−α) − (1 − π)(1 − α)(r + δ)ϑθ1−α =
(1 − ϑ)[y(s) − y(n)]




(r + δ + φθ1−α)(r + δ + απθ1−α) − (1 − π)(1 − α)(r + δ)ϑθ1−αª
(1 − α)θ−α ©
(r + δ)[ϑ + π(1 − ϑ)] + πφθ1−αª = y(n) − b. (30)
Conditions (29) and (30) are the eﬃcient counter-part of equations (17) and (18). They
fully characterize the set of eﬃcient labor market outcomes for any given values of πS. This
leads to our ﬁrst main result:10
Proposition 1 An equilibrium allocation never coincides with an eﬃcient allocation.
Proof. Replace φ by φ(θ,ϑ;π) in (17)-(18) and (29)-(30) and ﬁxav a l u ef o rπ = πE = πS
between 0 and 1. The resulting conditions for (θE,ϑ E) and (θSP,ϑ SP) only coincide when
α = β (Hosios’ condition) and β =1 . However, the case in which workers appropriate all
the rents is ruled out by assumption.
9This is driven by the forces that created the scope for multiple equilibria in Section 4.
10Throughout the analysis we maintain the assumption that φS < 1 so that both jobs are oﬀered in an
eﬃcient allocation.
13The proof of Proposition 1 demonstrates that Hosios’ condition is no longer suﬃcient to
guarantee eﬃciency when the market is populated by heterogeneous agents.11 In the next
section we attribute this result to a distortion of the equilibrium wage distribution. The
resulting distortions of the resource allocation are analyzed in Section 6.
6 Search externalities
In a market with trading frictions and free entry of ﬁrms the reservation values of workers
act as the relevant prices. To achieve an eﬃcient allocation these values need to coincide
with the shadow values of job seekers. However, comparing the solutions for the shadow
values with the corresponding expressions for U(i)
rU(l)=b + βφθ1−αS(l,n) (31)
rU(h)=b + βθ1−α[φπS(h,n)+( 1− φ)S(h,s)] (32)
reveals two diﬀerences. First of all, when evaluating the returns from search the planner
considers the entire surplus σ(i,j) of any future relationship, while workers only consider a
share β of the surplus. In other words, workers ignore the share (1−β) of the surplus that
accrues to ﬁrms. In the matching literature this is known as a thick market externality.T h e
diﬀerence with the standard matching environment is that this externality is diﬀerent for
the two types of workers. Second, unlike the planner, workers ignore the cost of congestion.
The resulting congestion externality is captured by the term (1 − α)θ1−ασ that is missing
in (31) and (32).
With homogeneous agents we know that these two externalities cancel out when β = α,
but when workers have diﬀerent skill levels this scope for an eﬃcient allocation disappears.
In our economy the size of the congestion externality is the same for all job seekers, while
the positive externality on ﬁr m si ss t r o n g e rf o rh i g h - s k i l lj o bs e e k e r st h a nf o rl o w - s k i l lj o b
seekers. Consequently, under Hosios’ condition the reservation value of low-skill workers
exceeds their shadow value because (1 − α)θ1−ασ>(1 − β)φθ1−αS(l,n) while the reser-
vation value of high-skill workers reﬂects only part of their shadow value λ(h) because
(1 − β)θ1−α[φπS(h,n)+( 1− φ)S(h,s)] > (1 − α)θ1−ασ.
11Notice that the condition α = β =1corresponds to a labor market with a linear matching technology,
M(u,v)=u, in which workers are paid the entire output of their job (w(i,j)=y(i,j)). But in this case
there exists no interior equilibrium because no ﬁrm is willing to create a job unless either θ or γ =0 .
14To formalize this point, we consider a simple public choice exercise. Suppose that the
government can introduce a system of lump-sum taxes and subsidies on unemployed workers
denoted by τ(i),i = l,h.12 For positive values of τ(i) the ﬂow income of an unemployed
worker is reduced by τ(i), while a negative value corresponds to a subsidy. Given these
changes, we can proof the following result:
Proposition 2 When β = α there exists an eﬃcient equilibrium under the purely redis-
tributive tax scheme {τ∗(l),τ∗(h)} that satisﬁes
τ∗(l)=( 1 − α)θ1−α
SP (1 − ϑSP)[σ(h) − φσ(l,n)] > 0 (33)
τ∗(h)=−(1 − α)θ1−α
SP ϑSP [σ(h) − φσ(l,n)] < 0 (34)
where σ(h)=φπσ(h,n)+( 1− φ)σ(h,s).
Proof: Appendix B.
In other words, if the government wants to correct the distortion of the equilibrium wage
distribution, it should impose a tax on low-skill job seekers and redistribute the proceeds
in the form of an unemployment subsidy to high-skill job seekers.13 The net-proceeds of
this policy intervention would be equal to zero as u[ϑτ∗(l)+( 1− ϑ)τ∗(h)] = 0 (see also
Appendix B). Thus, under Hosios’ condition bargaining compresses the wage distribution
relative to output without altering the mean of the distribution. The latter coincides with
the appropriately weighted mean of workers’ shadow values.
It is easy to determine the eﬀect of the Pigouvian taxes on the decisions of agents. A
tax on low-skill job seekers weakens their outside option and this stimulates the creation of
unskilled jobs. Likewise, the unemployment subsidy τ∗(h) will strengthen the bargaining
position of high-skill job seekers vis-à-vis all employers and this may destroy their willingness
to accept unskilled jobs. In the latter case, the economy would move from an ineﬃcient
equilibrium with cross-skill matching to an eﬃcient outcome with ex post segmentation.
Both possibilities will be explored in Section 6. But ﬁr s tw ew a n tt or o u n do ﬀ the analysis
o ft h es e a r c he x t e r n a l i t i e sw i t has h o r td i s c u s s i o no ft h er o l eo ff r e ee n t r y .
12This technique was ﬁrst proposed by Shimer and Smith (2001a). They consider a system of search
subsidies, while our system of lump-sum taxes and subsidies is more reminiscent of a regular system of
unemployment insurance.
13We do not claim that this tax scheme is realistic. Nonetheless, Proposition 2 suggests that governments
can achieve welfare gains by diﬀerentiating the beneﬁt entitlements of unemployed workers.
156.1 Endogenous job creation
At ﬁrst glance, the optimality conditions for v(j) may suggest a similar tension between the
private and social returns from search as in the case of workers. However, in the optimal
allocation the distribution of vacant jobs satisﬁes a no-arbitrage condition and this allows
us to rewrite the optimality conditions for v(j) as:14
γ =( 1− α)θ−α(1 − ϑ)σ(h,s) (35)
γ =( 1− α)θ−α[ϑσ(l,n)+( 1− ϑ)πσ(h,n)] (36)
Under Hosios’ condition these condition have exactly the same format as the free entry
conditions in the decentralized equilibrium. The distortions of the job distribution are
therefore driven entirely by the distortion of the relative wages.
7 Too many good or bad jobs?
We are now in a position to characterize the implications of the distorted wage distribution
for job creation, matching and unemployment. Throughout the analysis we shall assume
that Hosios’ condition is satisﬁed.15
Under this common restriction on workers’ bargaining power, we showed that bargaining
compresses the wage distribution relative to productivity. A ﬁrst consequence of this wage
compression is that bargaining distorts the relative proﬁts of jobs. Compared to the eﬃcient
allocation the low skill premium makes it too attractive to recruit high-skill workers, giving
ﬁrms an incentive to create more skilled jobs and fewer unskilled jobs than in the eﬃcient
allocation. Second, the low reservation value of high-skill workers may distort their matching
decisions. In some case they may ﬁnd it optimal to accept unskilled jobs while social welfare
is maximized under ex-post segmentation. The aim of this section is to show that these
two types of distortions have radically diﬀerent implications for the labor market position
of low-skill workers.
The distortion of the job distribution can be demonstrated for the case of cross-skill
matching. Suppose that the economy starts from an eﬃcient job distribution (θ,φ)=
(θSP,φ SP) and that πE and πSP are equal to 1. In this case Proposition 2 implies that
14For details see Appendix B: Optimality conditions for vacancies.
15T h ec a s ei nw h i c hβ violates Hosios’ condition is analyzed in Blázquez and Jansen (2003).
16V (s) > 0. In response to these positive proﬁts ﬁrms will create more skilled jobs and these
additional jobs congest the market for ﬁrms with unskilled jobs. Thus, despite the fact that
the average wage is correct (V (n)=0at (θSP,φ SP)) there will be too few unskilled jobs in
equilibrium. Formally,
Proposition 3 Suppose that πE and πSP are equal to 1. When β satisﬁes Hosios’ condition,
the number of vacant jobs per unemployed worker is the same as in the eﬃcient outcome,
θE = θSP, but the equilibrium is ineﬃcient because φE <φ SP.
Proof: Appendix B
The proof of Proposition 3 exploits the fact that conditions (18) and (30) deﬁne a unique
solution for θ that is invariant to changes in y(s), µ or φ. On the margin the crowding-
out of unskilled jobs is therefore one-to-one: for every skilled job in excess of the eﬃcient
number, the market destroys exactly one unskilled job.16 The next corollary summarizes
the implications for the labor market outcomes.
Corollary 4 Under cross-skill matching the labor market generates more unemployment
among low-skill workers, less mismatch of high-skill workers and a higher overall unem-
ployment rate u than in the eﬃcient allocation.
The above results show the usefulness of our simple model. Due to the common values for
b, δ and γ the model is highly tractable.17 Nonetheless, for the case of ex post segmentation
(πE = πSP =0 )i ti sd i ﬃcult to obtain analytical results that demonstrate the shortage
of unskilled jobs although the intuition is clear. In this case ﬁrms with unskilled jobs hire
exclusively low-skill workers who need to be paid more than their shadow value λ(l), while
the ﬁrms with skilled jobs continue to beneﬁt from the relatively low wage of high-skill
workers. In the next section we demonstrate this point with a simple numerical example.
The same example is also used to analyze the case in which πE 6= πSP.
7.1 Numerical example
To illustrate the full range of possible distortions, we compute numerical solutions for a
sequence of economies that are characterized by diﬀerent values for y(s). The benchmark
16This argument ignores the fact that the decrease in φ tends to raise u. Hence, to maintain the value of
θ, there have to be more vacant jobs in the economy.
17The assumption of a Cobb-Douglas matching function is not essential. All the results of this section can
be derived with a standard constant returns to scale matching function.
17parameters are chosen to guarantee reasonable values for the unemployment rates (denoted
by un(l)=ϑu/µ and un(h)=( 1− ϑ)u/(1 − µ)) and they are virtually the same as in AV.
T h er e s u l t sa r ep r e s e n t e di nF i g u r e1.
Figure 1:E ﬃcient vs. decentralized allocations
Parameter values: r =0 .05;δ =0 .2;b =0 .15;γ =0 .4;
y(n)=1 ;µ =2 /3;α =0 .5;m(θ)=2 θ0.5.












































In all four panels the solid lines represent the sequence of eﬃcient steady states while
the dashed lines correspond to a sequence of steady state equilibria. When the model gener-
ates multiple equilibria we only report the allocation corresponding to cross-skill matching.
Inspection of the bold lines shows that the gradual increase in y(s) initially gives rise to
a smooth increase in the eﬃcient share of skilled jobs. This process continues until the
negative value of y(n) − (r + δ)λ(h) forces a switch from cross-skill matching to ex post
segmentation. At this point, we observe a steep decrease in the number of unskilled jobs
combined with a sharp increase in the unemployment rate of both types of workers. The
evolution of the equilibrium allocation is similar. However, since high-skill workers are
under-valued the switch to ex post segmentation takes place at a higher value of y(s).
Thus, there exists a non-empty range of parameters in which the equilibrium may exhibit
cross-skill matching while ex post segmentation would maximize social welfare.
18Second, the numerical results conﬁrm our prediction that the labor market generates
too few unskilled jobs when πE = πSP. However, the most important feature of Figure 1
is the striking diﬀerence between the labor market outcomes with eﬃcient and ineﬃcient
matching rules. When πE 6= πSP the distortions are much bigger than under either cross-
skill matching or ex-post segmentation. Furthermore, in this case we obtain the opposite
prediction for the labor market position of low-skill workers. Whenever mismatch reduces
social welfare, low-skill job seekers face a lower unemployment rate than in the eﬃcient
allocation. The explanation for this result is the strong interaction between the matching
pattern and job creation. Given that high-skill workers are willing to accept unskilled jobs,
ﬁrms supply a larger number of these jobs than in the eﬃcient allocation and the matching
frictions imply that some of these jobs will be taken by low-skill workers.
This strong interaction between the matching pattern and job creation is a common
feature of matching models with a unique ﬁnal good.18 Here we show that this non-convexity
may overturn the conventional result (of models with a ﬁxed distribution of jobs) that skill
mismatch harms low-skill workers. An optimal policy intervention that reduces the degree
of skill mismatch may therefore cause a fall in the welfare of low-skill workers.
Finally, it is worthwhile to mention that the basic message of Figure 1 does not change if
we allow for distinct values b, γ and δ. Nonetheless, the realism of the model would improve
if we allowed for lower separation rates on skilled jobs, so that high-skill workers return less
frequently to the pool of unemployed workers when they are appropriately matched.
8 Many types of workers and jobs
So far, we have considered the simplest possible model with two types of workers and jobs.
Furthermore, we imposed the restriction that low-skill workers cannot perform skilled jobs.
In this last section we show how we can generalize our results to an environment with
an arbitrary number of workers and jobs and less stringent conditions on the production
technology.
Let’s assume that there are i =1 ,2,..N types of workers and j =1 ,2,..M types of ﬁrms.
Like before σ(i,j)=[ y(i,j) − (r + δ)λ(i)]/(r + δ) denotes the eﬃcient surplus of a match
between a worker of type i and a ﬁrm of type j. Furthermore, we introduce the symbol ϑi
18Acemoglu (2001) considers a model with heterogeneous jobs that produce imperfectly substitutable
goods. In his model the job distribution is partly driven by the tastes of consumers and this reduces the
responsiveness of the job distribution to changes in the matching pattern.




j=1 φj =1 . In that case the asset value equations for λ(i) and U(i) satisfy:
(r + δ)λ(i0)=b + θ1−α
M P
j=1









where π(i,j) ∈ [0,1] is a generalized version of the optimal matching rules (12) and (24).
Inspection of the above equations shows that all workers whose expected productivity
PM




j=1 φiϑjπ(i,j)y(i,j) are under-
valued under Hosios condition, while the opposite is true for workers with a below-average
productivity. Again the wage compression has no eﬀect on the average wage because
(r + δ)
PN
i=1 ϑiλ(i) is equal to r
PN
i=1 ϑiU(i) when α = β.
Now let’s consider ﬁrms. With a common cost parameter γ the (eﬃcient) mass of vacant
jobs is determined by a system of 2 × M vacancy conditions
γ =( 1− α)θ−α PN
i=1 ϑiπ(i,j)σ(i,j)
γ =( 1− β)θ−αPN
i=1 ϑiπ(i,j)S(i,j).
I np r i n c i p l ew em a ya s s u m et h a tt h em a t c hp r o d u c t i v i t yy(i,j) is strictly positive in all
M × N types of matches. We only need to make sure that that the N types of workers
do not obtain a maximum value of y(i,j) i nt h es a m et y p eo fj o b ,b e c a u s ei nt h a tc a s et h e
equilibrium job distribution would be degenerate.19 For example, in our benchmark model
with two types of jobs and workers we may allow y(l,s) to be positive as long as y(l,s) is
smaller than y(l,n).O t h e r w i s e ﬁrms would only oﬀer skilled jobs. Our assumption that
skilled jobs require high-skill workers is therefore merely a simpliﬁcation that reduces the
possible number of matching conﬁgurations.
The above discussion indicates that our results apply to situations in which workers
with diﬀerent skill levels prefer diﬀerent jobs. When these diﬀerences are big enough so
19As explained in the Introduction, this excludes the case in which y(i,j) is strictly increasing in j for all i
as is assumed in Shimer and Smith (2001a). It also exludes the (log) supermodular production functions of
Shimer and Smith (2000) and Gaultier and Teulings (2004). The latter technologies, that induce assortative
matching in models with a given pool of agents, can only be incorporated in a model with free entry if we
assume that the output of jobs are imperfect substitutes.
20that agents reject some of the matches, ﬁrms will tend to provide an excessive amount of
jobs for the workers with an above-average productivity.20 Moreover, in equilibrium these
workers may accept jobs that are too far below their qualiﬁcations.
9C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
In this paper we provided an exhaustive analysis of the distortions in labor markets with het-
erogeneous workers and jobs. While most studies have to resort to numerical techniques21,
we obtain clear analytical results for the distortions in the aggregate labor market outcomes.
The robustness of our results suggests that our analysis applies to a broad class of equilib-
rium unemployment models Furthermore, our predictions challenge the conventional view
that mismatch harms the workers at the bottom of the labor market.
In future work we would like to consider a model with imperfectly substitutable ﬁnal
goods. In this alternative setup the composition of employment is partly determined by the
tastes of consumers and so we may expect that labor demand is less responsive to supply side
f a c t o r st h a ni no u rs t u d y( s e ef o o t n o t e18). Other topics for future research are the design
of optimal labor market institutions and the evaluation of actual labor market policies in a
calibrated model of two-sided search. In both cases our results our results provide a useful
normative benchmark.
20Suppose that all M × N candidate types of matches are consummated in equilibrium. In that case
all ﬁrms would face the correct expected wage costs, and so the equilibrium would be eﬃcient. Another
situation in which the wage distortions cancel out at the aggregate level is when
PM
j=1 φjy(i,j) is the same
for all N types of workers. In this last case workers are good at diﬀerent jobs while they all have the same
expected productivity. This alternative setup is somewhat similar to the symmetric setup of Marimon and
Zilibotti (1999) who obtain an eﬃcient outcome under Hosios’ condition.
21A recent example is Danthine (1995). He develops a quantitative model of two-sided search that compares
the decentralized outcome to the outcome under a “golden matching rule” that is chosen by a benevolent
social planner.
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2310 Appendix A: Constrained Eﬃcient allocations
In this Appendix we describe the necessary conditions for the existence and uniqueness of
an eﬃcient steady state allocation with a non-degenerate job distribution.
Existence of eﬃcient allocations with a non-degenerate distribution
In a ﬁr s ts t e pw en e e dt or u l eo u tt h ep o s s i b i l i t yo fa ne ﬃcient steady state outcome with
φSP =1 . In other words, we need to ensure that a skilled vacancy raises the value of
net-output when the economy is in a steady state with only unskilled jobs.
In a candidate eﬃcient steady state with φSP =1 , all job seekers have the same value
for society because y(l,n)=y(h,n)=y(n).L e tλ denote the associated shadow value of a
typical job seeker. From the co-state equations (25) and (26) it follows that λ satisﬁes







while the optimality condition for vacant jobs reduces to







The solution of (37) is given by:
(r + δ)λ =
(r + δ)b + αθ1−αy(n)
r + δ + αθ1−α . (39)
Plugging this shadow value into the optimality condition for θ yields:
γ =( 1− α)θ−α y(n) − b
r + δ + αθ1−α. (40)
The right-hand side of (40) is a strictly decreasing function that maps values of θ ∈ [0,∞)
onto itself and so there exists a unique solution for θ that solves (40). Denote this value by
θD. To rule out that (θ,φ)=( θD,1) is an eﬃcient outcome, it is suﬃcient to ensure that
(1 − µ)(1 − α)θ−α
D
·
y(s) − (r + δ)λ
r + δ
¸
> (1 − α)θ−α
D
·










r + δ + αθ1−α
D
(42)
24Given (42) the planner can raise social welfare by replacing an unskilled job by a skilled
job although the latter can only be ﬁlled by skilled workers who make up a fraction 1 − µ
of the (unemployed) population.
In the rest of the analysis we assume that (42) is satisﬁed.
Existence of eﬃcient steady states
An analysis of eﬃcient steady states is potentially restrictive because there might exist non-
stationary allocations that generate a higher level of welfare (e.g. Shimer and Smith, 2001b).
Here we show that there exist no gains from non-stationary deviations if the economy starts
from an eﬃcient steady state with πSP =1 . T h i sg u a r a n t e e st h a te ﬃcient steady states
with cross-skill matching are well-deﬁned solutions of (21).
Under cross-skill matching the eﬃcient steady state is fully characterized by a vector
{θSP,φ SP,ϑ SP,u SP} that solves the following four conditions:
γ(r + δ + αθ1−α)
(1 − α)θ−α = y(n) − b (43)
ϑ(r + δ + θ1−α)
(r + δ + φθ1−α)(r + δ + αθ1−α)
=
(1 − ϑ)[y(s) − y(n)]






δ + θ1−α¤ (45)
φ =
µθ1−α(1 − ϑ)+( µ − ϑ)δ
θ1−αϑ(1 − µ)
(46)
The above conditions are obtained by setting π equal to 1 in (29), (30), and the steady
state conditions (19) and (20).
Arrow’s generalization of Mangasarian’s suﬃciency theorem (Kamien and Schwartz,
1991: 222) implies that the vector {θSP,φ SP,ϑ SP,u SP} is a well-deﬁned solution to the
dynamic optimization problem (21) with πSP =1if the maximized Hamiltonian function
H0 (the Hamiltonian evaluated at the optimal values of φSP and θSP deﬁned by by (46)
and (43), respectively) is concave in the variables u(h) and u(l) for given λ(h) and λ(l).





































(1 − µ)u(l)(r + δ)
< 0














2 (r + δ)
> 0
Finally, calculating the value of the Hessian determinant shows that |H| =0 . Thus, the
Hessian matrix H is negative semi-deﬁnite because the ﬁrst principal minor is negative
while the second principal minor (the Hessian determinant) is zero.
This establishes that the conditions for Arrow’s suﬃciency theorem are satisﬁed, but is
does not establis uniqueness because the optimized Hamiltonian is quasi-concave.
Uniqueness of the cross-skill matching eﬃcient allocation
It is easy to demonstrate that eﬃciency conditions (43)-(46) have at most one solution.
F i r s t ,o b s e r v et h a t( 4 3 )d e ﬁnes a unique solution for θSP.









δ + φθ1−α¢. (47)
Substituting this relationship into (44) and ﬁxing the value of θ at θSP yields
µ(δ + θ1−α
SP )
(1 − µ)(δ + φθ1−α
SP )
·
r + δ + θ1−α
SP
(r + δ + φθ1−α




(r + δ)(y(n) − b)
(48)
The left-hand side of this equation is strictly decreasing in φ while the right-hand side is a
constant. Hence, given θSP t h e r ee x i s t sa tm o s to n ev a l u ef o rφSP that solves (48). The
resulting pair (θSP,φ SP) completely determines the eﬃcient allocation.
Comparative statics
On the basis of the above results we can also establish the comparative eﬀects of changes
in µ and y(s).
Lemma 5 In an eﬃcient cross-skill matching allocation ∂θSP/∂y(s)=0 , ∂φSP/∂y(s) < 0,
∂λ(h)/∂y(s) > 0 and ∂λ(l)/∂y(s) < 0.
26Proof. From (43) it follows that ∂θSP/∂y(s)=0while (48) implicitly deﬁnes φSP as
a decreasing function of y(s). Hence, an increase in the relative productivity of skilled
jobs raises the share of skilled vacancies, 1 − φSP, while the overall ratio between vacant
jobs and unemployed job seekers remains unchanged. The latter implies that the planner
accepts a higher unemployment rate among low-skill workers to beneﬁt from the higher
relative productivity of skilled jobs and so ∂λ(l)/∂y(s)=( ∂λ(h)/∂φSP)·(∂φSP/∂y(s)) < 0.
Similarly, from (26) it follows that ∂λ(h)/∂y(s)=( ∂λ(h)/∂φSP)·(∂φSP/∂y(s)) > 0 because
σ(h,s) >σ (h,n).
The same line of argument can be used to analyze the the comparative static eﬀects of
changes in µ and 1 − µ:
Lemma 6 In an eﬃcient cross-skill matching allocation ∂θSP/∂µ =0 , ∂φSP/∂µ > 0,
∂λ(h)/∂µ > 0 and ∂λ(l)/∂µ > 0.
On the basis of the above results it follows immediately that the planner will opt for cross-
skill matching if y(s) − y(n) and 1 − µ are relatively low, while ex-post segmentation is
eﬃcient in economies with a large share of high-skill workers and a large diﬀerence between
y(s) and y(n).
11 Appendix B (proof of main results)
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2
Derivation of vacancy conditions (35) and (36)
To obtain the optimal vacancy conditions we equate the right-hand side of conditions (27)







[πσ(h,n) − σ(h,s)] (49)
Substituting this no-arbitrage condition back into (27) and (28) yields equations (35) and
(36) in the main text.
Derivation of the welfare-maximizing taxes
A comparison between (35)-(36) and (31)-(32) shows that the decentralized allocation is
eﬃcient if and only if. rU(i)=( r + δ)λ(i) for i = h,l.
After the introduction of the lump-sum taxes and subsidies, the asset value equations
for unemployed workers can be written as follows:
27rU(l)=b − τ(l)+θ1−αφ[W(l,n) − U(l)] (50)
rU(h)=b − τ(h)+θ1−α {φπ[W(h,n) − U(h)] + (1 − φ)[W(h,s) − U(h)]} (51)
The optimality of the tax scheme {τ∗(l),τ∗(h)} follows from the substitution of (33) and
(34) into the above equations. When we set θ and φ equal to their eﬃcient values, this yields
the desired result that rU(i)=( r + δ)λ(i) for i = h,l. Finally, substitution of these values
into (31)-(32 and (12) yields (θE,φ E,πE)=( θSP,φ SP,πSP). Thus given {τ∗(l),τ∗(h)} there
exists an equilibrium with an eﬃcient resource allocation.
To determine the sign of the optimal tax we can use the following lemma.
Lemma 7 The shadow values of job-seekers satisfy λ(h) ≥ λ(l) with a strict inequality if
0 <φ E < 1.
Proof: Suppose that φσ(l,n) > σ(h) ≡ φπσ(l,n)+( 1− φ)σ(h,s) so that λ(l) >λ (h)
from (25) and (26). But λ(l) >λ (h) implies that
(r + δ)λ(h)=b +
1
r + δ








{φ[y(n) − (r + δ)λ(l)] = (r + δ)λ(l).
This is a contradiction. Thus, λ(h) ≥ λ(l) and σ(h) ≥ φσ(l,n) with a strict inequality when
φ<1.¥
Purely redistributive tax
To proof that we can ignore the government budget constraint, it suﬃces to show that
ϑτ∗(l)+( 1− ϑ)τ∗(h)=0 . Inspection of (33)-(34) shows that this conditions is satisﬁed
because ϑSPτ∗(l)=−(1−ϑSP)τ∗(h)=( 1− α)θ1−α
SP (1 − ϑSP)ϑSP [σ(h) − φσ(l,n)]. Thus,
the Pigouvian tax on low-skill job seekers is completely redistributed to high-skill job seekers.
Another way to show that the distortions of the wage payments cancel out at the aggre-
gate level is to compare the average income of job seekers with the average shadow value of
job seekers in an eﬃcient allocation. This yields:
ϑrU(l)+( 1− ϑ)rU(h)=b + βθ1−α[φϑS(l,n)+φ(1 − ϑ)πS(h,n)+( 1− φ)(1 − ϑ)S(h,s)]
ϑ(r + δ)λ(l)+( 1− ϑ)(r + δ)λ(h)=b + αθ1−α[φϑσ(l,n)+φ(1 − ϑ)πσ(h,n)+( 1− φ)(1 − ϑ)σ(h,s)]
28Given that S(i,j)=( y(i,j) − rU(i))/(r + δ)a n dσ(i,j)=( y(i,j) − (r + δ)λ(i))/(r + δ)
these two expression coincide when β = α.¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3
A cross-skill matching equilibrium corresponds to a vector {θE,φ E,ϑ E,u E} that solves
γ(r + δ + βθ1−α)
(1 − β)θ−α = y(n) − b (52)
ϑ
(r + δ + βφθ1−α)
=
(1 − ϑ)[y(s) − y(n)]
(r + δ)[y(n) − b]
(53)
plus steady state conditions (45) and (46). Equations (52) and (53) are obtained by setting
π equal to 1 in (17) and (18). The following result is immediate:
Lemma 8 Suppose that πE = πSP =1 . In that case θE = θSP when β = α.
Proof. When β = α, condition (52) coincides with (43). Hence, θE is equal to the unique
eﬃcient value θSP.
The above lemma shows that we can restrict attention to the share of unskilled jobs. In-
serting (47) into (53) and using the result that θE = θSP when β = α yields the following
condition:
µ(r + δ)(y(n) − b)















Similarly, inspection of (48) shows that
µ(r + δ)(y(n) − b)
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In order for (56) to hold, it must be the case that φE <φ SP. As ∂φ/∂ϑ < 0 (from 47), then
we have ϑE >ϑ SP. ¥
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